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RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON
THE STUDY OF HISTORY IN SOUTH AFRICA
I had planned on the occasion of my Inaugural Lecture to 
speak about my researches in mediaeval history, to which, almost 
surreptitiously I have returned since my appointment to the 
Chair of History at Rhodes University. This would have been 
construed, if not as self-indulgence, then certainly as escapism by 
those whose studies it is at once my duty and my pleasure to 
provoke. Instead the theme or more accurately the fugue of 
my lecture, is what threatens to be a disappearing species, namely 
“homo integer", the whole man about whom it is the business of 
the historian to write. It is possible now, as never in the past, 
to pick up books purporting to contain history, and yet not find 
in them any individual mentioned by name. Or if a name creeps 
in like that of Yorick in Hamlet it is a label to a skull called a 
skill. An example of this is to be found for instance in the 
Penguin best seller, “What Happened in History.” by Professor 
V. Gordon Childe. While it is true that in the text names do 
occur, in the whole index, only one man is cited, and that 
merely as adjunct to a theorem—"Pythagoras’ theorem”. We can 
use the index to find out about Symbols, Querns, Gods, Women, 
Camels (for transport) and even “Small Change.” But if we seek 
to understand how one of the greatest thinkers of antiquity 
sought to solve the questions with which the public affairs of his 
day confronted him, then we scour the text and find this: “A 
champion of oligarchy and a defender of slavery, Aristotle 
appears as the mouthpiece of the class from which his patrons 
and pupils were recruited and as the victim of the contradictions 
in the economy of the City-state which were all too apparent in 
his day."(1) Reading back a little, we do admittedly find that
(1) V. G. C h ild e , What happened in History, p. 223.
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this “victim” and this “mouthpiece” was in fact a man, and one 
of “comprehensive interests and encyclopaedic erudition.” One 
presumes that he lived, because the author states that in 321 B.C. 
he died, and that “the vast Aristotelian corpus consists of notes 
of lectures”. It would seem that in death we shall not be 
divided.
It is true, that to many of the questions which Aristotle 
asked, he found answers, especially in the field of science, which 
are now proven to be wrong, and that the veneration in which 
he was held, a position not altogether dissimilar to that accorded 
to scientists today, was at times a shackle to intellectual progress. 
But to go on to assert that by the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s 
system with all its blemishes was virtually incorporated in the 
sacred canon of the Christian Church is demonstrably false.(2) 
In the first place, Aristotelian science was unknown as a system 
in the west until the latter half of the 12th Century, and by that 
time, the Christian Church had a pretty clear notion of what 
were and what were not sacred canon as distinct from views 
consonant with those canon. In the second place, the Church, 
for reasons which if not defensible, are like all errors compre­
hensible, condemned as heresy parts of Aristotle’s Physics, which 
were held to limit the omnipotence of God. God, the theo­
logians argued could create a void, He could create an infinite 
universe; ergo Aristotle’s Physics being the work of mortal man, 
was wrong in parts. Already before the condemnation of 1277, 
there was a small group of critics who questioned Aristotle’s 
theories of motion, and from the 14th Century onwards, the 
schools of Paris and Oxford concentrated on finding alternative 
explanations of the motion of projectiles and falling bodies. 
Nicholas of Oresme was to proclaim that God might well have 
started off the universe like a clock and left it to run itself. Jean 
Buridan, in the same century began to work out a theory of 
impetus which was to influence the thinking of both Leonardo da 
Vinci and Galileo, both of whom had access to and used his 
work.'(3) So far from being incorporated in the Canon of the 
Church, then, parts of the Aristotelian Physics were put beyond 
the pale of orthodoxy because they were not consonant with the 
mediaeval concept of the omnipotence of God.
What is remarkable about Aristotle is, not that he erred, but 
that, confronted with a complex society and a tremendous 
advance in the frontiers of human learning, he had the courage 
to ask questions as well as to face facts and to ask how man 
would use his creations to serve human ends. The questions he 
asked were the kind of questions which man, whatever his social
(2) Ibid.
(3) H . B u tte rf ie ld , Origins of Modern Science, pp . 1-14.
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forms, needs constantly to reformulate. Most of his tentative 
answers can only be related to the city state, and are only 
comprehensible against the background of the Hellenic world. 
But the questions he asked, though inflected by local circum­
stances will I believe remain pertinent all through time, for, even 
if an answer, absolutely right and therefore timeless could be 
found, its transliteration would depend on agents who, like us, 
are both mortal and fallible. So far from being a mouthpiece, 
if metaphor must be found, he was and is the Grand Inquisitor.
I do not want to be misunderstood, save only perhaps as a 
cat may be, who looks at a King and finds the Crown somewhat 
awry. What I challenge, is certainly not the author for whose 
work I have profound admiration, nor the book, though it is 
not unimpeachable, but the presumption of its best selling title. 
It implies that all that happened in the past is knowable and 
known to Professor Childe, that history ceased at the point when 
Professor Childe laid down his pen, and that the data of 
archaeology, namely, solid remainders, are an infallible index, 
when in truth they are little more than is the tombstone to the 
memory of him whom it commemorates. De mortuis nil nisi 
monumenta.
There are things that archaeology cannot tell us, just as 
there are things that history cannot tell us, but inasmuch as 
history is the story of man, his thoughts and his actions of which 
archaeological remains are but samples, the difference between 
the two studies is not that between certainty and uncertainty, but 
that between what is true in a prescribed field and that which may 
bring us a little nearer truth itself. I do not claim that history 
proves anything or that it can provide formulae for the resolution 
of our dilemmas. It can perhaps suggest the evils we should 
avoid, and the principles we should seek to follow; it cannot 
secure that we profit from the demonstration. But it can challenge 
our dogmas, chasten our arrogance and temper our egoism. 
Above all it can prevent us from the perpetual temptation to 
confuse the passions of the transient moment with the certitude 
of the eternally right and just.
Saic quoque dissimiles ad finem tendimus omnes
Nemo pedem retrahit quo sibi limes erit—
Likeness is none between us, (yet) we go to the selfsame end.
The foot that hath crossed that threshold shall no man 
withdraw again.(4)
History then is the story of mortal men and women, and I 
do not bother to add the conventional “in society” because short
(4) V e n a n tiu s  F o r tu n a tu s ,  t r a n s .  H e le n  W a d d e ll, Mediaeval Latin Lyrics, 1948.
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of ship-wrecked mariners, hermits and anchorites, I cannot think 
of men and women who did not in fact live in society. Even 
Simon Stylites descended occasionally from his pillar, and his 
dicta as Toynbee has pointed out exercised a profound influence 
over a society much wider than that of his contemporaries in the 
East Roman Empire. His society had a temporal as well as a 
spatial dimension, and his ideas contributed to the ordering of 
men’s lives long after he was dead. It is because I see in history 
the story of men that I am profoundly disturbed by current 
trends in the newer universities, particularly in America and in 
South Africa. In the schools of both continents, the teaching 
of history has given place to pedagogic-all-sorts called social 
studies. Children are asked to study the world, physical and 
social, through adult eyes, and implicitly to accept two dogmas 
which I regard as pernicious. The one is that the story of 
progress is the story of man’s adaptation to environment. If 
this were so, western man would seem to have lagged behind the 
Esquimaux who managed this much very efficiently centuries ago. 
The tradition of the west is not of adaptation to but of rebellion 
against environment, and as Toynbee has suggested, civilisation 
grows by successive responses to the challenge of environments 
identified and adapted by itself. The other dogma is more 
serious. It is the calm assumption that writers of text books 
can take their view of the present, arbitrarily select a few facts 
from the past, and then claim that an arbitrary definition is 
proven by an arbitrary selection. In the universities of both 
countries, I consider that there is a drift in the same direction, 
and, covered by the quasi-parliamentary privilege which this 
occasion has the sole merit of affording, I propose to speak about 
two features which seem to me to be crippling the study of the 
humanities, not specifically at Rhodes University, but in South 
African Universities generally.
The first is this. The tendency of university regulations is 
to make available to students with not even a rudimentary outline 
of history against which to balance it, a specialised approach to 
a specialised branch of historical study. If one can imagine 
such a dire calamity as that in a thousand years’ time all cords 
of civilisation in this country will have perished save only the 
university calendars, then one can picture posterity calling this 
“the land where the Jumblies lived”. They, you will recall, went 
to sea in a sieve. That, I suggest is how Arts students are 
condemned to venture in our universities. We make a sieve 
with strands of many kinds of wire—ecclesiastical history, art 
history, constitutional history, history of literature, history of 
political ideas, history of native administration, history of 
economic ideas and institutions, and at no point secure that they
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are woven into a good, strong life-saving cable. It is possible to 
study any or all of these things, without as it were a stout flooring 
of general history, and without any approach to the understand­
ing of the historical process as made by the interaction of all 
these different emphases on the lives of men. This is 
educationally unsound, and since I decline absolutely to recognise 
departmentalised man, within the small amount of time allotted 
to the study of history, I endeavour to teach the full mocking 
profile of the human story, and not merely the legs of 
Ozymandias. I do not plead that more history should be taught, 
though I think it should, but I do urge that the study of the 
humanites should be so integrated, that homo sapiens, is 
recognised as the most complex of all created things, and not 
partitioned unto the nth power of academic regulations. Almost 
any study on the Arts side, pursued steadily and integrated 
broadly, can give a richer interpretation of man, than successive 
bites at his fictitious intellectual anatomy. It may be that we 
should revert to an intermediate examination, and thereafter 
allow students to do one or two things well. For I venture to 
think that the first university in this country which makes possible 
liberal, which necessarily means thorough teaching in any one of 
the humanities, will not only attract students, but make a positive 
contribution to the problems of this land. It is not my province 
to advance solutions, but it is my province as a historian to state 
my belief that academic regulations in this country are making 
of studies in the Arts, a thing of shreds and patches, and to 
reiterate my known belief that on the wise teaching of the 
humanities may well depend the future of mankind itself.I am 
minded, as I say this, of Collingwood’s provocative Essay on 
Metaphysics; in particular of the concluding and characteristic 
thrust: “When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the 
sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professional 
goose, consecrated with cap and gown . . . but cackling is my 
job, and cackle I will”.(5)
The second thing which perturbs me, and others more able 
that I to express it, is the growing tendency to approach History 
much as the Victorian school teacher might do in an object 
lesson: to demonstrate that it shows or teaches that, or illustrates 
some mechanistic law of historical locomotion. Unlike the school 
teacher, who, given a lump of iron ore, did not attempt to 
demonstrate that it was clay, the modern theorists are given to 
taking history and moulding into their own lay figures. With 
the possible exception of A. J. Toynbee’s Study of History, all 
theories, or philosophies of history, however conflicting the 
philosophical premises from which they severally start, have
(5) R. G. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford, 1940.
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certain features in common. The theory is evolved and ex­
pounded as a philosophy before history is examined. Secondly, 
with the spotlight, often admittedly, the brilliant spotlight of the 
theory, they probe about the moraine of history, looking for 
hard spots that will support the theory. What stands is labelled 
proof; what does not, is by-passed, logically, as irrelevant and 
almost irreverent. Thirdly, because the examination is either 
from effect to cause, or some effects to some causes, for growth 
which is erratic, they substitute a chain of human development 
wherein each link determines its neighbour. Fourthly, having 
established an operative system in the past and the present they 
claim the necessary extension of it into the future. Men are 
given a broad hard-metalled road to tread, their sole liberty 
being to vary their pace or close their eyes. They do not stray 
because they cannot stray. They have ceased to be men and 
have become part of MAN, propelled by mythical forces 
summed up as History. On such a track, there is no GIANT 
DESPAIR or SLOUGH OF DESPOND, equally there is no 
HOPEFUL and no ENCHANTED LAND. On the one hand 
these theories give us a feeling of almost God-like power, because 
in accepting them we have solved the riddle of life; on the other 
hand they give us a tremendous easement of spirit for as 
individuals we are no longer responsible for what happens. We 
have not, each one of us to test ourselves on a Pilgrim’s 
Progress but merely to stumble along on a pilgrimage 
where the tail of the past logically propels the head to 
its destination. If superstition be defined as the belief that 
things oustide man interpose to control men, surely this 
is superstition.
To a certain extent, historians are to blame for the trespasses 
they have invited, inasmuch as they themselves used to claim 
that history was an exact science, that in due course they could 
establish an objective structure of facts about the past, and 
thereby make available all there was to know about the past. 
If historians were, as some claimed, infallible, there was some 
prospect that laws of history could be built up, not a priori but 
empirically. They overestimated the evidence and underestimated 
the difficulties of interpretation. As a result, they did more 
than expose themselves to the logicians; they made themselves 
vulnerable to counter-attack which the historians launched 
against the logicians. The historicists, or, as I noticed them 
recently described ‘the aggressive subjectivist-presentist-relativists’(6) 
argue that all history is contemporary history, and mean thereby 
a variety of things since each is not only his own historian but
Q uoted  in  a  fo o tn o te  to  a r t ic le  in  American Historical Review, A p ril ,  1950,
by  C. M. D e s tle r , f ro m  W . S . H o lt’s  a r t ic le  in  Journal o f the History of
Ideas, J u n e ,  1940.
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his own psycho-analyst. Of their dicta these seem to be the most 
significant. They claim that our awareness of the past depends 
on our contemporary experiences, and that these condition at 
once the things we want to know about the past, and the way we 
know them. Secondly they assert that changes in historical 
interpretation are not as the historian deludes himself, due to 
the discovery of fresh evidence, but to changes in the con­
temporary social complex and their reaction on the mind and 
experience of the historian. Thirdly they claim that a fixed and 
finished past with its points objectively mapped is inconceivable 
since it depends on present evidence organised by present 
experience. Changes in the interpretation of history are then 
due to successive reorganisations of successive social complexes, 
in the minds of successive historians. There is not time, nor is 
this the occasion to trace in detail, as perhaps I should do, the 
varying inflexions of historicism given by each of the historicists. 
They reach a reductio ad absurdum, in Becker’s lively and 
stimulating book, “Every man his own Historian.”
“It should be a relief to recognise that every generation, our 
own included, will, must inevitably, play on the dead whatever 
tricks it finds necessary for its own piece of mind.'(7) This is 
but a grand way of formulating the London street cry:
“Tuppence coloured, penny plain
Try your luck and come again.”
Each man has his private view of the past. But whether one 
uses the language of the Patrician or the Plebs, the various 
theories of historical relativism which have behind them the 
weight of Croce, Dilthey, Mannheim and Beard, and in some­
what more disciplined form the philosophical system of 
Oakeshott’s “Experience and its Modes” cannot lightly be 
brushed aside.(8) But I think we should not brush aside either 
the experiences of Benedetto Croce himself. For the complex 
of social ideas to which Croce’s experience was related, was a 
liberal one: the complex of social ideas to which Mussolini 
related his thought was Fascist, and as Mussolini by a political 
coup, threw the force of the State behind Fascist ideas and 
Croce was driven into exile, Power was the arbiter.
In this country, the theories of relativism present problems 
which no teacher of history, and indeed no citizen dare ignore. 
If by society, the relativists mean as they claim, those in the 
midst of whom the historian lives in the sense that he shares their 
ideologies, then on that reckoning, there are three societies and 
not one in this country. If historical relativism were pushed to 
its logical conclusion in South Africa at a minimum estimate,
(7) C. L . B e c k e r , Everyman his own Historian, p  253.
(8) M. O a k e sh o tt , Experience and its modes* C am b rid g e , 1933.
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there would be three schools of historical writing: Nationalist, 
British and Native. Each would be equally right in relation to 
his respective society, for, to paraphase Croce the false is simply 
that which does not respond to the effective demands of 
intellectualised social experience. At the moment, in all our 
universities in this country, there are traditions of scholarship 
which are relative only to an absolute concept of what is true. 
University lecturers do not substitute an autobiography of their 
intuitive processes for an honest academic study, and they 
refrain from treating history as a functional relative. In the 
schools, the position is not so firm. In my opinion two concessions 
have already been made to a concept of education as functional 
and relative to a social group: the one is the Bantu Education 
Act; the other is the substitution of Social Studies for History 
and Geography in the schools.
In America, the new theories of Historiography, and the 
increasing emphasis in the schools on social studies certainly 
have moved in parallel chronological planes and would seem to 
be related in what may come to be regarded as the Plasticine Age 
of Modern Thought. In 1946, the Report of the Committee on 
Historiography, (Bulletin No. 54 of the Social Research Council) 
was drawn up by a team of American Historians, and the 
opening chapter by Charles A. Beard is to be taken as the 
official point of conversion in America. This made explicit 
what had been implicit in much of American writing for more 
than a generation; since 1946, relativism provides the key, not 
yet to all, but certainly to much American speculation. On the 
one hand American opinion seems to demand that historians 
should work with the social scientists to define social values, on 
the other hand that they should relate their writing to social 
values which theoretically have still to be discovered. This looks 
like the modern version of the chicken and the egg. I do not 
like it. For if History is to survive as functional and relative to 
society, we have to ask whose society? and which? We have to 
ask whether this is not “old priest writ large” and whether we 
are not going to get in all thought a series of geocentric universes. 
More, when men speak of society as the gravitational centre of 
thought, they mean the state which alone has power to enforce 
if necessary social ideas which it identifies with itself. In 
practice to speak about the social relativism of the historian, 
is to think about the political relativism of the historian, and 
I shall only believe to the contrary when some American 
Universities sponsor as their text “History of the American 
Frontier”, written by a Red Indian in the light of his social 
complex, a “History of Political Persecutions in Democracies”,
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writen preferably by a Virginian, and a “History of American 
Capitalism”, written by a Marxist. The early intuitionalists 
began by extending to history their theories of aesthetics: they 
visualised the historian as artist and poet, free to create in his 
own right. But their successors, who with a smattering of 
physics, delved into social relativity without a prior injection of 
moral philosophy, need to think again.(9) It is one thing to 
accept that there is a subjective element in all thought, and to 
accept that the experience of the individual is enriched by his 
social milieu, it is another thing to state that all historical think­
ing is subjective and relative and that the only society is the 
contemporary society into which the historian is tossed by fate. 
If one is going to go the whole hog in relativism, it is just as 
sound and probably wiser to argue that when I read Ovid I 
belong to a Roman world, and my ideas, or to be truly relativist, 
my experience, is then illuminated by the Augustan world of 
Ovid. Why not go further, and argue, as is possibly Correct, 
that since I can think about Ovid while I drink a cup of tea, I 
am twice blessed — with the joys of the Augustan and the 
comforts of modern society!
On the one hand then, stand the logicians; on the other 
hand, the historicists, prepared like the saplings of Sinis the 
Pinebender to pull and rend the historian asunder. So far he 
has proved a tough victim. Most of the people who write about 
the nature of historical speculation do not attempt to write 
common or garden history. They dabble in archaeology or the 
history of ideas, and eschew drudgery and its attendant discipline. 
I should state my own position like this. The study of history, 
like any other academic study, is a quest towards truth; unlike 
other studies, its chief concern is with the thought and actions 
of men in the past. I make this distinction between thought and 
action because I disagree with Collingwood’s supposition that 
action is the product of and therefore the clue to t h o u g h t . (10)To 
the contrary, action may be the sport of chance; it may be the 
reflex movement of habit or the wild gesture of rage. Time for 
the Historian is the fixed firmament of his thinking. The 
procession of events is not a logical sequence, but a series of 
causal sequences which may or may not, in whole or in part, 
incapsulate(11) into a causal sequence. What has been completed 
in the past, is for all time irrevocable. The men whose deeds 
and writings have left the traces which we call evidence, have 
perished. Shakespeare was not Homer on a repeat programme,
(9) C. L . B ec k er, op. cit. p . 2 5 2 : “ T h e  fo rm  a n d  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  rem em b ere d  
e v e n ts , l ik e  th e  e x te n s io n  a n d  v e lo c ity  o f p h y s ic a l o b je c ts , w ill v a ry  w ith  th e  
t im e  a n d  p la c e  o f th e  o b s e rv e r” .
(10) R . G. C o llingw ood , The Idea of History, “ E p ile g o m e n a ” , O x fo rd , 1946. 
(11) T e rm  used  b y  C o llingw ood  in  h is  Autobiography, O x fo rd , 1938, p . 98.
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nor was Napoleon a re-incarnation of Alexander the Great. 
But though the authors of actions perish, some of their actions 
which for good or ill reacted on the lives of their contemporaries, 
flow into a causal sequence. This is nevertheless an open 
inheritance which their successors can accept, modify, reject, or 
perish in rejecting. True, the majority of men accept out of 
habit and without thought, but there never has been a time when 
someone or other did not kick against the traces of the past. 
Even in complex modern societies we do have an element of 
choice: with our superior scientific techniques and economic 
resources we have indeed potentially a wider margin of choice 
than our predecessors. For instance, if we wanted to do so, and 
I think I could make out a case for it, we could build Pyramids 
for our Prime Ministers. If we wanted to we could sell all that 
we have and give to the poor; or like Schliemann we could save 
all we earn and seek to discover Troy or some other Holy Grail. 
“It is in ourselves that we are thus and thus.”
The historian then, has not one but three kinds of evidence. 
Firstly evidence or traces which describe happenings at point x 
in time. Secondly, dependent on one, beginnings without 
endings, or more properly without survival, by this I mean 
institutions or ideas which did not mature but were stunted at 
some point in their development. These are the lost expeditions 
of human enterprise, or in Spencerian idiom, “dead bones and 
skulls of men whose lives have gone astray.” They are often 
the most fascinating part of history, interesting to the historian 
by virtue of their mortality; interesting to all men because to 
dwell on the charms of the might have been is by imagination, 
the heritage of all. Thirdly, and also dependent on one, the 
historian has endings and beginnings, that is to say, institutions 
and ideas which have survived into the living present. It may be 
argued that the survival and continued growth of institutions is 
itself evidence of their merit or social utility, that society is judge 
of its own needs. But what the judge says, however wisely, is 
not evidence, and this kind of evidence, no less than in class II is 
incomprehensible, and in that sense unknowable apart from the 
evidence in class I. The problem for the historian is not how 
the steam engine in South Africa works, but why the steam 
engine, which was invented in England comes to be in South 
Africa, and why the steam engine is here, and not some other 
things. But if the steam engine were not here, it would still be 
the historian’s duty to follow up the evidence of the invention of 
steam engines discoverable in class I. This, to his credit, is 
also the interest of the man in the street who enjoys lost causes 
quite as much as present results. I recall for instance, one of 
the many delightful passages in A. J. Toynbee’s “Study of
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History”. He describes how a cultural relations officer, sent by 
Mussolini to America, in the thick of the Abyssinian War, was 
politely frozen out by the student audiences he was called upon 
to address. American officials worked hard to provide an 
antidote to his discomfiture, and amongst other things took him 
to the Museum and showed him a rare treasure, an early 18th 
Century Bible translated into Indian dialect. For the first and 
only time, the Italian smiled pointedly and asked the one 
embarrassing question, “But where are these Red Indians now?”. 
I recall too one of the S.M.T.(12) bus drivers on tour from 
Edinburgh to the Trossachs who, after a gory and gloating and 
painfully accurate account of the Battle of Bannockburn which 
he told with much glee to his Sassenach passengers, concluded 
his narrative thus, “Aye, and it’s a strange thing, there’s more 
English than Scots in Bannockburn the noo.” Invariably a 
Sassenach rose to the bait and was goaded into uttering the kind 
of Ah! which implies that the verdict of history is indeed a just 
verdict. The delighted driver would turn to deliver the last 
word as only a Scot can deliver it, “Aye, under the ground.”
I suggest then, that a society if indeed it can ever know 
itself as a society, certainly cannot know itself by current 
analyses of existing institutions, and that for posterity, what is 
not in our present will be as significant as what is. I think that 
what I have called the first class of evidence, is basic to historical 
thinking, and that the dead ends of Class II are as important as 
the live wires of Class III. Granted then that written evidence 
of the past is that without which there can be no history, what 
is the quality of that evidence? The historicists deny its objective 
existence and the possibility of its objective exploration. I do 
not propose to go into the contortions of discussing either 
theories of vision or theories of knowledge, but to state the 
common sense presuppositions and disciplines of my craft.
Firstly, it is true, and the historian admits it, that the 
surviving evidence is incomplete, and its survival or otherwise is 
often due to sheer chance. Secondly, the evidence, that is the 
traces of past activity, has an objective existence which is quite 
independent of my thinking about it. The wording of the Albert 
Memorial no less than the monstrosity itself, would not otherwise 
so stubbornly have defied the thoughts of three generations of 
Londoners. In the same way, evidence of title deeds to property 
in Grahamstown purchased in 1854 was evidence in a law suit in 
the 1920’s. It was objective in that neither the contemporary 
thinking of the plaintiff nor that of the defendant, could, without 
physical act, alter the statements inscribed on these deeds. 
Thirdly, there are rules for testing whether a document is or is
(12) Scottish Motor Traction Company.
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not what it purports to be. The process is highly technical and 
it is scientific. Fourthly, there are also established procedures 
for gauging with reasonable certainty whether what is written or 
printed on the document, is or is not credible. Here the 
procedure is analogous to that of the law courts, and it is as 
infallible, at least, as the process of the courts, which when 
confronted with six conflicting versions, nevertheless return one 
verdict and not six verdicts. True, the historian cannot cross- 
examine, but having very often more evidence than that available 
at the time to contemporaries, is often in a better, not a worse 
position than contemporaries to judge. For instance, only last 
week I came across a verdict, or more correctly an official 
opinion of the Attorney General at Cape Town on land titles at 
Salem, which he would certainly not have given had he had 
available to him evidence which is available to me.(13)
These four things: the admittedly fortuitous survival of 
evidence, its objective existence, the science of testing, and what 
I may presume to call the forensic of assessing, I take to be the 
disciplines of my craft and I assert that they not only make it 
possible to reconstruct what occurred, but have become so much 
a part of the historian’s thinking that they emancipate him from 
the hypnosis of social forms. There are many kinds of con­
temporary thinking and experience, but any significant thinking 
is that of the individual. Society is a concept. The individual 
is real. When Society can write symphonies and paint frescoes, 
then Society may consider that it can write history and not 
before. And when I find that a society has an objective 
existence which can survive the removal of every individual from 
it, then and then only will I concede its translation from concept 
to concrete (in which it will probably be then embedded).
But, it will be argued, the historian must do more than 
reconstruct a narrative from the evidence, he must trace cause 
and effect, he must interpret. Narrative, the historicist argues, 
is mere chronicle, real history is intuitive, like water divining 
(the metaphor is mine). Here my answer is clear. The 
historian is bound by a Trinoda Necessitas. The basic job is to 
get the facts straight, and narrative is prior to interpretation in 
every sense of the word prior. Then, and only then can the 
historian venture to interpret, and where possible to relate cause 
and effect. His task is to express but not to dictate judgments 
which can never be more that the decision of one mind which 
however highly trained, and because highly trained, will never 
masquerade either as the omniscience of God, or as a camou­
flaged social conscience.
(13) C ap e  o f Good H o p e  B lue  B ook, Respecting: a Separation of the Eastern and 
W estern Provinces, C ape , 1947, pp . 151-2.
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I should like, if you will bear with me, briefly to illustrate 
these three points. Let us look at a common or garden narrative. 
This vacation I have, through the courtesy of the City authorities, 
been looking into the records of the Municipal Commissioners, 
who from 1837 onwards, began the organisation of municipal 
life in Grahamstown. The records are complete, and afford a 
perfect articulation of the administration of the town. Here was 
a small group of men, storekeepers and tradesmen in the main, 
who met weekly to handle civic business. Civic sense did not 
descend like a pentecostal gift; neither did the Commissioners 
find it easy to cope with dilatory colonial officials, evasive rate­
payers, muddle-headed market masters, and the eight ward 
masters whose zealous listing of complaints made up a good part 
of each week’s business. It was an onerous, often a disheartening 
business. The total income to be expected from rates at 1/- in 
the pound, was if everyone paid, of little more than £700, so 
that for any large ventures, like the water tank in Bathurst Street, 
subscription lists were opened. There was a small-pox scare in 
1841, a war scare in 1842, and war with a vengeance in 1846 
when Commissioner Joshua Norden was killed in action at the 
farm Begelly. By the middle of 1846, all the clerk could do was 
to enter in the minute book “every source of municipal revenue 
is now closed.” But in the midst of alternating prosperity and 
panic, the day to day jobs had to be done. The water supply 
for example was such a difficulty that it almost flows through the 
minute book itself. Water ran along open furrows with tanks 
and wells at convenient points. Householders had to be warned 
not to run off channels for their private supply without paying 
the fee of a pound. Women especially in the upper end of New 
Street had to be warned not to wash clothes in the public streams, 
and butchers had to be taught not to be so casual in the disposal 
of their offal. It was not until 1846 that the butchers came to 
heel and agreed that their offal was to be removed to the high 
ground 300 yards from the Vlei north of the burial ground.
It is small wonder that every effort was made to substitute 
a pipe line for the open furrows. After much hesitation at so 
large a venture, tenders were sought. Three inch, cast iron pipes 
could be bought from Levick and Sherman in Cape Town, but 
the 6 inch pipes for the main leads had to come from an English 
foundry. Negotiations were opened with Theophilus Richards 
of Birmingham with whom the Commissioners continued hence­
forward to deal. The immediate problems were not merely to raise 
the money, but to transfer it with the minimum expense. It was 
finally agreed to place Wesleyan or Glasgow Missionary Society 
Bills within three months of the contract—a neat little example 
this of the unsupected role of the missionary in the economic
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development of the Province. Laying the pipes when at length 
they arrived nearly stirred up a hornet’s nest, for the Com­
missioners proposed to place the first line along the South side 
of High Street. Immediately the North side of High Street 
petitioned against this, and the frontier war of the pipes was only 
solved by the formula of Solomon, they were placed fairly and 
squarely in the centre of the street.
By small shifts, sober finance, but no flinching from public 
needs, by 1847, in the very year when in Britain the shocking 
revelations of the Health of Towns Commission Report were 
exposing the defects in sanitary conditions and water supply in 
the great industrial centres there, Grahamstown laid its iron 
pipes.
Now no great philosophic principles are involved in this; no 
epic gushes from iron water pipes. That I will readily concede. 
I am quite prepared to allow this to be labelled by the historicists 
as mere chronicle, for so as presented it is. I am not though 
prepared to be informed that I do not really know it happened. 
Nor am I prepared to have it explained to me that my process of 
thinking was dictated by contemporary experience. I know 
perfectly well why I went to the City Hall. I went firstly out of 
curiosity because I am interested in documents, secondly I went 
to find out if there were any traces of Robert Godlonton’s 
activities in the municipal records. There were. Quite amusing 
ones. Having studied the documents I also think I am entitled 
to state that in their way, they are just as fascinating a record 
of the past efforts of men as is for instance, van Riebeeck’s 
Journal which I know and possess, and also that life in South 
Africa as it is today has many and not one single point of origin.
Or consider, however briefly, the second task, that of seek­
ing to relate cause and effect. Clearly the historian cannot 
proceed as a laboratory technician, by trial and error, or by 
planned experiment. For every event is a unique happening and 
every actor a single creation. There may be analogies. There 
can be no repetitions. There are challenges to thought but no 
complete symmetry in the answers which the historian gives to 
the questions he confronts. More. “Cause” and “Effect” so 
often posed as Siamese twins seem to me to have for the historian 
neither a single nor a conjoint existence, or even an identity save 
as a notion. One cannot picture causes on one side and 
consequences on another, since they flow through events, and 
events are but the actions of men, and often quite irrational. 
History is not an equation, but drama, now comic now tragic 
with the varying pitch and tension of life as we know it. I do 
not know the causes of Leonardo da Vinci, and I certainly should 
not care to state the consequences of John Calvin. Truth is I
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cannot teach text book history very well, for it always boils down 
to a horrid little jingle in my head.
One, two, three, four, five 
Reasons why he was alive 
Seven, eight, I ’m out of breath,
Consequences of his death.
And since further, without being didactic and tedious, I cannot 
analyse here an epoch of history, I will reduce my problem to its 
simplest form. Imagine that I have discovered and tested 
documentary proof that King Alfred did in fact burn a batch of 
cakes at 2 p.m. in a peasant’s hut. It would be legitimate to ask 
what caused Alfred to burn the cakes: Possibly the woman’s 
fire was too hot; possibly the woman stayed out gossiping too 
long; possibly Alfred preferred to eat burned cakes and did it 
deliberately; possibly he was tired and went to sleep; possibly at 
that time he had a streaming cold and could neither smell nor 
see very well. All these are possible reasons for the burning of 
cakes as you may test in any kitchen. Suppose that in my 
passion for exactitude I went further, and worked out a statistical 
analysis of the causes and incidence of cake burning, and with 
due calculation and allowance for probable error, I ascertained 
that x burnt cakes were due to this factor, and y to that etc. 
That moreover, 12.40 p.m. was the time when the greatest 
number of small cakes was burned and 3.30 p.m. the time when 
big cakes were most likely to be burned. Should I get any nearer 
to an infallible answer to my problem: Why did King Alfred
burn the cakes at 2 p.m.? I think not. Suppose further that 
unconvinced, I explored the possibility of a cyclical movement 
in the incidence of cake burning. I could recall that in America, 
there was an institution known as the “Foundation for the study 
of cycles”; and that it had discovered that “atmospheric ozone 
as measured in Paris and London, varies in what appears to be 
the same cycle as that of tent caterpillars, salmon, lynx and 
deaths from heart disease in U.S.A. and Canada.”(14) If I were 
able to tack cake burning on to the lynx, the caterpillar and the 
salmon would I then be nearer to a solution? I think not. It 
would be wiser and rational to argue like this: from other 
written evidence, we know that Alfred was conscientious, that he 
respected other people’s property, that he was courteous; we 
know that at the time this incident occurred, he was gravely 
perturbed about his Kingdom and the probability is that he 
forgot the lesser in the greater worry.
You may feel this is absurd. Certainly I intended it to be 
so. I also intended it to show what seem to be the limitations of 
a great deal of social research, excellent though it is. I do not
(14) E. H u n tin g to n .  Mainsprings of Civilisation, 1945, p. 492.
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think the historian’s task will alter, though in many respects it 
will be easier when, in hypothetical years to come he looks back 
on our time with its wealth of economic and social data. The 
historian will still want to ask what manner of men thought like 
this, and why with all the wealth of data, men still continued to 
act like men and not like that Caliban of the calculators, a 
rational animal. What will social researchers do with the data 
they compile? Will they stand back like Pontius Pilate and 
wash their hands of it? Or will they see in their researches a 
possible key, one on a bunch, not a master key, to the problems 
which in the last resort, are problems of human relationships 
created by human fallibilities? To the historian, the apparatus 
of social research is a phenomenon worthy of exploration, its 
conclusions a problem rather than a solution.
If you recall, I sought leave to give you three illustrations 
of the limitations and possibilities of historical speculation. I 
have sought to show how narrative is prior to interpretation, how 
uncertain the historian feels about separating causes and con­
sequences, or even relating them in too solemn a didactic. 
Thirdly, though I have stayed too long, I should like to show that 
looking steadily at a past may and should compel us to think, 
though it cannot dictate our judgments. Let us examine a society. 
It is one where tribal structure has broken down and society is 
in process of re-formation. Men live in groups of kin, but 
without a rigid family structure.(15) They can with permission 
of the communities move from one group to another, or, in other 
words they can migrate.(16) Their means of subsistence, apart 
from some spoils of war including slaves, is farming; part 
pastoral, part tillage. Cattle, sheep, pigs, are individually owned, 
but pasturage is common. One bull serves the cows of three 
villages and there is therefore a very heavy fine for absconding 
with the bull.(17) Land is plentiful fortunately, since tillage is by 
primitive hoe and a wooden plough tipped with iron. No one 
has yet discovered how to yoke a horse or ox without half closing 
the animal’s windpipe. Livestock is constantly stolen, sucking 
pigs, sheep, cows and occasionally the bull are lifted over night, 
and are as invariably pursued by day; “If any man traces cattle to 
another man’s land, he who owns the land, shall if he can, follow 
the trail until it passes beyond his boundary”(18) . . . “if he cannot 
he shall pay the value of the cattle and the whole case shall be 
settled by the two districts in common.”(19) Huts are burned 
down over the heads of the occupiers; slaves are stolen, women
(15) S a lic  L a w , T i tle  X L II . E . F . H e n d e rso n . Select H istorical Documents of 
the Middle Ages, p. 189.
(16) Ibid. T i t le  X L V . p . 183.
(17) Ibid. T itle s  I I  a n d  II I .
(18) A tte n b o ro u g h , Laws of the Earliest English K ings. A th e ls ta n .  C ap . 2. 
(19) Ibid. A th e ls ta n , C ap . 8. 4.
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are raped, maidens are kidnapped by the dishonest and purchased 
by the honest who are however entitled to the return of money 
paid, if the bride herself prove dishonest.(20) Further “if anyone 
buys a wife, and marriage does not take place, the bride’s 
guardian shall return the bridal price.”(21) And if a widow is left 
with children the husband’s family shall pay each year six 
shillings, a cow in summer and an ox in winter. (22) There is, 
we notice some sense of social responsibility, left over from tribal 
days.
But it is a violent society where custom yields readily to 
conflict, and the blood feud has not been forgotten, though it is 
frowned upon. “He who kills a thief shall be allowed to declare 
with an oath that he whom he killed was a thief trying to escape 
and the kinsmen of the dead man shall swear an oath to carry on 
no vendetta against him.”(23) Crime, usually violent, is met by a 
tariff of fines meticulously calculated. “If any person strike 
another on the head so that the brain appears, 30/-”. “But if it 
shall have been between the ribs or in the stomach, 30/- besides 
five shillings for the physician’s pay.”(24) Although witchcraft is 
listed as a crime even more serious than homicide or cattle 
thieving,(25) witchcraft is common and the physician in return for 
his five shillings uses magic quite as much as medicine. The fever 
of wounds he dispels by this formula, “take a snail and well clean 
it. And take the clean foam, mix with human milk. Give to 
drink. He will be better.”(26) There is little difference between 
physician and witchdoctor: one is open the other secret.
True this society is ruled by a King, but the monarch what­
ever his regalia, proves his ability to rule the people by behaving 
like them on a more majestic scale. Massacre, murder, pillage 
are the weapons of what we call policy. This is a scene familiar 
to many of us here, but it is not set, as it might well be, against 
an African, but against a European backbround. This is a 
picture of European society in the late 5th Century and early 
6th Century, and I do not see that one can call it other than it 
was, barbaric.
It was into that society that Christian missionaries, monks 
and scholars began to penetrate. In 496 Clovis, King of the 
Franks was converted. In 597, Ethelbert, King of Kent, and 
royal conversions were accompanied by mass baptisms. It was
(20) Ib id . E th e lb e r t ,  C ap . 77.
(21) Ibid. In e , C ap . 31. 
(22) Ibid. In e , C ap . 38.
(23) Ib id . In e , C ap . 35.
(24) Salic Law. E. F. H e n d e rso n , Documents of the Middle Agres, Tit. XVII, 
3,4.
(25) Ibid. Tit. X IX , 1.
(20) J. H . G. G ro tta n  a n d  C. S in g e r , Anglo-Saxon Magic and Medicine, p.193
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not till the late 7th Century and 8th Century that Christianity 
made significant inroads in Holland and Germany. Utrecht, the 
first diocese to be founded in Holland, was set by Anglo-Saxon 
missionaries and their Irish brethren in a sea of barbarism. 
More than one English missionary was martyred in the Frisian 
mission field. Yet in the midst of peril, missionaries, 
emancipated from the limitations of their social milieu, by the 
ratio of their faith, not only talked, they worked. Line upon 
line, fingers cramped by cold, they copied in careful Anglo- 
Saxon hand the classical as well as the Christian texts. To 
Utrecht,(27) for instance we owe what is now known as the Vienna 
MS. of the early books of the Fifth Decade of Livy; to Hersfeld 
one of the oldest MS. of Tacitus.(28) Now and again they flinched. 
Even a perilous sea passage seemed better than the monotony of 
doing good, and in the margins of their manuscripts, they left 
traces like this.”
“— if but Christ would give me back the past 
And this white head of mine were dark again 
and that first strength of days 
I too might go your ways.
All those far seas and shores that must be crossed 
They terrify me:—
Go to the land whose love gives thee no rest 
and may Almighty God,
Hope of our life, lord of the sounding sea 
of winds and waters, lord.
Give thee safe passage on the wrinkled sea
Himself thy pilot stand
Bring thee with mist and foam to thy desire,
Again to Irish Land.”(29)
Those missionaries laid the foundations of Christianity and 
Civilisation; they were the architects. And when Charlemagne 
pushed the frontiers of the west from the Rhine to the Elbe, it 
was the missionaries who added assimilation to conquest. It 
was not always a gentle process. To the contrary, Charlemagne’s 
frontier wars rank among the bloodiest and most brutal in 
history, just as the subjugation and conversion of the Frisians
(27) T h e  V ie n n a  M S. o f  L iv y  is  th e  so le  M S. to  g iv e  th e  f i r s t  five  books o f  th e  
f if th  d ec ad e  o f L ivy . I t  b e lo n g ed  to  a  B ish o p  o f  D u u rs te d e  n e a r  U tr e c h t  
in  th e  8 th  C e n tu ry . W . L ev iso n , England and the Continent in the 8th 
Century, 1946, p p . 62 a n d  144 ; c f. a lso  S an d y s , History of Classical Scholar­
ship.
(28) M in o r  w o rk s  o f  T a c itu s  p re s e rv e d  so le ly  in  a  H e rs fe ld  M S. o f  th e  9 th  
C e n tu ry . W . L e v iso n , op. cit. p. 144.
(20) C o lm an , Mediaeval Latin Lyrics, t r a n s .  b y  H ele n  W a d d e ll, p . 85, a n d  cf. 
ibid. p. 315.
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and the Saxons ranks as the most thorough and constructive. 
Whether Charlemagne would have managed better if he had first 
consulted a team of historians, sociologists, anthropologists and 
psychologists, I cannot tell. Certainly no one asked whether the 
Saxons and later the Vikings should be kept as a social museum 
piece, and no one thought other than that Europeans must either 
civilise or be destroyed. For five centuries, not one, the little 
core of half-civilised countries, stood at bay against heathendom; 
they survived because they had two weapons in their armoury: 
the capacity to fight and the capacity to civilise. If then I am 
asked, can barbarians be civilised? I can only answer, “In certain 
circumstances, yes.” Europe was civilised, but so very gradually 
that as late as the 12th Century, Church penitentials condemned 
“Whosoever shall pollute New Year’s Day by magic enquiries 
into the future”(30) and “whosoever shall believe that good or evil 
comes to him from the croak of jackdaw and raven, or from 
meeting any priest or animal whatsoever.”(31) It was not till 
1215, more than six hundred years after the conversion of the 
barbarian Kings, that ideas about justice had been sufficiently 
diffused for trial by ordeal to be abolished. As for witchcraft the 
persecutions of witches survived, to be exported to America in 
the 17th Century as current social practice, and to provide the 
Victorian Buckle(32) with ammunition for his magnificent if one­
sided denunciation of Scottish Calvinism in the same century.
What kind of conclusions can emerge? I should say I am 
entitled to make three statements and to ask one question. Europe 
was barbarian, that is to say we have come up from barbarism; 
our forefathers whatever their nationality were barbarian. 
Secondly they were civilised chiefly by missionaries and our 
heritage of learning was preserved mainly as a result of mission­
ary effort. Thirdly it is clear that it was a slow task; for men 
cannot be changed in the twinkling of an eye, particularly in a 
society which is economically backward, primitive and illiterate. 
The question I am bound to pose is this. Have we taken this 
evidence into account in making our current assumptions in 
South Africa? I freely admit that South Africa in the 20th 
Century is not Europe in the 5th Century. Civilisation has 
many new techniques. The gap between civilisation and 
barbarism if more easily bridged, is more stark. Ours moreover 
is a complex industrial economy, inter-related by commerce of 
ideas and goods, with other competing civilisations. Our 
problems are global not manorial. Our heritage too includes 
that other European inheritance, the colour bar, which seems to 
have originated in the 17th Century at the moment of impact on
(30) Q uoted  f ro m  G. C. C o u lto n , Life in the Middle Ages, v . l ,  p . 34.
(31) Ibid.
(32) H. T . B uck le , History o f Civilisation, v.3, passim.
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and the Saxons ranks as the most thorough and constructive. 
Whether Charlemagne would have managed better if he had first 
consulted a team of historians, sociologists, anthropologists and 
psychologists, I cannot tell. Certainly no one asked whether the 
Saxons and later the Vikings should be kept as a social museum 
piece, and no one thought other than that Europeans must either 
civilise or be destroyed. For five centuries, not one, the little 
core of half-civilised countries, stood at bay against heathendom; 
they survived because they had two weapons in their armoury: 
the capacity to fight and the capacity to civilise. If then I am 
asked, can barbarians be civilised? I can only answer, “In certain 
circumstances, yes.” Europe was civilised, but so very gradually 
that as late as the 12th Century, Church penitentials condemned 
“Whosoever shall pollute New Year’s Day by magic enquiries 
into the future”(30) and “whosoever shall believe that good or evil 
comes to him from the croak of jackdaw and raven, or from 
meeting any priest or animal whatsoever.”(31) It was not till 
1215, more than six hundred years after the conversion of the 
barbarian Kings, that ideas about justice had been sufficiently 
diffused for trial by ordeal to be abolished. As for witchcraft the 
persecutions of witches survived, to be exported to America in 
the 17th Century as current social practice, and to provide the 
Victorian Buckle(32) with ammunition for his magnificent if one­
sided denunciation of Scottish Calvinism in the same century.
What kind of conclusions can emerge? I should say I am 
entitled to make three statements and to ask one question. Europe 
was barbarian, that is to say we have come up from barbarism; 
our forefathers whatever their nationality were barbarian. 
Secondly they were civilised chiefly by missionaries and our 
heritage of learning was preserved mainly as a result of mission­
ary effort. Thirdly it is clear that it was a slow task; for men 
cannot be changed in the twinkling of an eye, particularly in a 
society which is economically backward, primitive and illiterate. 
The question I am bound to pose is this. Have we taken this 
evidence into account in making our current assumptions in 
South Africa? I freely admit that South Africa in the 20th 
Century is not Europe in the 5th Century. Civilisation has 
many new techniques. The gap between civilisation and 
barbarism if more easily bridged, is more stark. Ours moreover 
is a complex industrial economy, inter-related by commerce of 
ideas and goods, with other competing civilisations. Our 
problems are global not manorial. Our heritage too includes 
that other European inheritance, the colour bar, which seems to 
have originated in the 17th Century at the moment of impact on
(30) Q uoted  f ro m  G. C. C o u lto n , Life in the Middle Ages, v . l ,  p. 34.
(31) Ibid.
(32) H .  T .  B uck le , History o f Civilisation, v.3, passim.
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alien societies. We cannot argue that because civilisation 
triumphed through faith in the 8th Century, it will triumph in 
the 20th Century; nor can we prove that our new techniques 
ought to be applied to the same ends; nor even can we be con­
fident that our faith measures up to that of the past. Nevertheless 
I think the facts of the past are significant, and are part of the 
total evidence that no man can ignore in formulating his duties 
and obligations. The facts of history do not tell any man what 
he ought to think now, certainly they do not assume that we all 
think alike. They do mean that every man and woman ought to 
think afresh and ask whether we are going the best way about the 
only task we do agree upon, namely, the preservation of Western 
civilisation: Because I teach history I am forced to ask, what is
that civilisation which in South Africa we are pledged to 
preserve? What is it that two years ago South Africa helped to 
defend, not on the Fish River, not the Limpopo, but in remote 
Korea?
Nor can I flinch from formulating my private answers to 
these questions, for they are the assumptions which, after more 
than a quarter of a century of study, have come to be part of my 
philosophy of life. Here in South Africa we are professedly a 
European and a Christian community whose VALUES as distinct 
from whose POWERS antedate the machine age. We live in 
the year of our Lord not in the year of our Ford.(33) Hitherto 
Western Civilisation has been characterised by qualities such as 
these: a quest for truth about all things, which stems back to the 
Greeks; a respect for law as based on a reasonable interpretation 
of a concept of Justitia, reconciling the rights of the individual 
with those of his fellow; a respect for the individual by virtue of 
his humanity and concern for humanity by virtue of Christ’s 
teaching; a desire to organise the kind of communities in which 
those ideals can find day to day expression, taking men as they 
are; and a capacity unequalled in recorded history to translate its 
SCIENTIA of which modern science is part, into practical 
devices to serve human ends. No civilisation has been so 
interested as the west in the story of its own making, in all good 
or ill that has forged or stunted its growth. That too might rank 
as a characteristic trait: it implies a certain integrity, an 
anxiety to meet the obligations of its inheritance, and to master 
its current resources towards their fulfilling.
(33) phrase coined by A. Huxley in “Brave New World.”
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For neither do we wholly know
And neither do we all forget
But those high things which once we saw
And still remember, those we hold
And seek to bring the truth forgot
Again, to that which we have yet.'w
It implies that we are not at the terminus, nor even at the end of 
a tether, but transmitters and adapters of a series of concepts; 
that progress is a transliteration of values and not of skills; that 
western civilisation has grown by the progressive diffusion and 
constant re-evaluation of its concepts. There are many things in 
the 20th Century which, as a historian I find profoundly disturb­
ing: one for instance is the tendency in the west to explain away 
and to minimise its differential qualities which seem to me to be 
superior to those of any other civilisation I have studied, and to 
have in them at their best, the quality of true universals. 
Violated, distorted, forgotten, as they have been many times in 
the past, their resiliency has proven greater than the wickedness 
of man, because in the west, the individual conscience, in the last 
resort, has been the arbiter of human conduct if necessary in 
the face of death. I doubt very much whether a democracy will 
be built anywhere, in isolation from western values, and I must 
say, reactionary though it may sound, I doubt whether playing 
noughts and crosses with ballot papers has any necessary, apart 
from convenient, relation to western civilisation.
But if I am gravely exercised in mind as to the risk of 
confounding civilisation with its political or its economical 
techniques, I am frightened and not merely perturbed at any 
picture of western civilisation as a graven image round which 
revolve the economic and political rituals of a caste.
We need then in South Africa to face the obligations of a 
western heritage, and to face them as living, not completed 
forms. We also need to face that part of our heritage which is 
South African. We are beleaguered by plausible ready-made solu­
tions which from whatever angle of the House they are hurled, are 
allegedly based on the premises of a history, which, being as I 
know without a reliable narrative basis, reads for the most part 
like Gulliver’s Travels. We re-live the myths of our history 
every day of our lives and we bring up our children to repeat 
them in the complicated social drill of the school structure. We 
distort our politics and call it history; we distort our history and 
call it politics and sometimes even policy. We speak of 
administrative, economic, social problems, when in part they are 
excuses for evading what are at root our honest intellectual and
(34) B o e th iu s , “ Q u aen am  d isco rs  fo e d e ra  r e r u m ” , t r a n s l .  by  H . W ad d e ll, 
Mediaeval Latin Lyrics ( a d a p te d  by  c h a n g e  o f  p ro n o u n ) .
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spiritual dilemmas. It does no good either to oversimplify 
them or to evade them or to call them by other names. We 
cannot put the clock back; indeed no country has ever done that 
without breaking the springs of its growth. But we can and we 
ought to look back steadily; at least we shall see one thing, 
namely three hundred years of change, expansion and growth in 
a restless story of human endeavour. We shall find laagers 
thrown round encampments, only to be broken for a new trek 
forward. No man till now has said, we will make a laager for 
civilisation and here we will sit down behind a barrage of 
legislation.
The Greeks were perhaps never shrewder than in their 
myth of Clio, who was the muse, both of history and of epic 
poetry. They portrayed Clio with a scroll in one hand, and in 
the other a basket. It is of the scroll, that is the need for a 
constant process of revision, and the concept of history as 
depending on narrative or epic that I have spoken at such length 
tonight. The basket was for manuscripts. What is needed, 
before it is too late, is for more and more manuscripts, either to 
pile into that basket, or at least to leave recorded some trace of 
themselves and their whereabouts. I should like to see all over 
the Union of South Africa, but particularly in this Province 
where Bantu, Boer and Briton first lived side by side, every scrap 
of evidence of every kind, conscientiously and in good faith, 
made available to historians before it is too late. We might well 
do what has been done on the Continent and in Britain, that is 
attempt at least a Provincial Register of Archives. Voluntary 
local committees could list the local sources; especially diaries, 
letters, memoranda, business records. These could, if preferred 
be left in situ, but they should be regarded and handled as what 
they are: valuable clues to the thoughts of men. Again and 
again as one works one discovers clues which cannot be followed 
up, for lack of evidence; but there is enough evidence to show 
that both Theal and Cory if they were alive today, would hastily 
revise their writing on Clio’s scroll. Nor, if we respect our 
traditions is this the kind of treasure which should be capitalised 
on the money market. To the contrary, if listed and used, it 
may well outlast our many monuments of stone. Whether we 
succeed or fail in meeting our challenges, it is on evidences that, 
looking back, men will estimate our difficulties and appraise our 
achievements. Far be it from me to encourage a merely 
parochial attitude to history; but if we are part of a wider world 
we are nevertheless a very distinctive part, and in some ways a 
distinguished part. We have potentially opened up Southern 
Africa to civilisation. We have made a great number of bungles; 
we have lost patience, and at times we have broken faith, but we
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have never yet resorted to a policy of blind extermination, nor 
kept our Xhosa Bibles in museums. Nor, and we should not 
forget it, have our sufferings been as great as their shadows are 
long. It is to illuminate those shadows that we need now, before 
it is too late, to search our records of every kind. Paper perishes 
and ink fades, and I think you will agree with me, that the lines 
with which I propose to conclude this lecture, should not wane 
into oblivion. I found them in the daily log book of a sheep 
farmer who lived not so many miles from here. In the midst 
of shopping lists, crops to reap, sheep to shear and all the engross­
ing business of a large sheep farm, I came across an entry written 
as most of us have written in the heat of frustration and bewilder­
ment. He did not write a tirade against the government. He 
did not write to the paper. He wrestled with it himself. If 
the average frontier farmer in the 19th Century needed the 
patience of Job, this one had the faith of Job, and the curious 
thing is that if I were to change the wording slightly, I could, did 
conscience not bid otherwise, ascribe it to St. Augustine at 
Canterbury or to St. Boniface at Utrecht. It is though written 
in the careful calligraphy of a practical farmer, who limited his 
writing to those things which were really necessary. If this 
lecture has the text I intended it to have, it is to be found in his 
handwriting and the words he wrote on March 31st, 1835: “O 
Lord, in the greatness of Thy mercy, save me from infidelity and 
unbelief, strengthen my staggering faith in the averting 
Providence of Thee my God . . . why those wicked caffers should 
be suffered to rob me of my three span of valuable working oxen 
I have with assiduity and care been for several years matching 
and training, and all those choice milch cows which supplied us 
with butter and my children and people with milk in abundance 
. . . . ” There speaks a man of stature so bold as to know his 
limitations and to know the difference between being angry and 
bewildered and being right. That fundamentally is what South 
Africans are most in danger of forgetting.
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